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Abstract
As China rises and the former glory of the U.S. hegemony slowly fades, the rest of the world is 
watching closely. Opinions and analyses on whether it will have a peaceful outcome or not are 
many and various. This study investigated contemporary Chinese foreign policy in an attempt to 
argue that economic objectives are too important for the Chinese Central Leadership to consider 
military aggression against the U.S. It examined Chinese Foreign Policy by looking at two ongoing 
Middle Eastern events; the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ”war on terror”. The research was carried 
out in form of a multiple case study based mainly on qualitative material in the form of government 
documents and media archives but also on quantitative data in the form of official statistics. A 
foreign policy analysis seen through the lens of four different theories of International Relations 
provided the theoretical basis of the data analysis. The findings of the study supported the author's 
argument that great power China is, in fact, seeking to make money not pursue global hegemony.
Keywords: Foreign policy, hegemony, economic growth, conflict, China, Middle East.
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Introduction
When countries or regions are in a state of conflict and instability, they are often viewed as a potential 
security threat by other states. But while the uncertainty about the future of a region in most cases will 
cause concern and insecurity it will also bring considerations about the emergence of new strategic 
opportunities in terms of both economic cooperation and diplomatic alliances. The fall of a regime 
may lead to a shift in a country’s stance on issues that have earlier been a barrier to cooperation and 
when choosing a stance on an unresolved conflict, be it voluntarily or not, it will affect a state’s 
international relationships and dealings. The conflict struck region in the Middle East is no exception. 
It has been widely argued that the main reason for the foreign presence in the region is the alluringly 
vast amount of natural resources that it possesses. The constantly evolving Arab-Israeli conflict is the 
source of many a political quarrel between states across the globe. And in the wake of the American 
led ”war on terror” following 9/11, came transitions in the involved Middle Eastern countries that 
have caused old alliances to blossom and new ones to form. The rise of China following the economic 
reforms of Deng Xiaoping have caused a dramatic increase in its international interactions sparking 
anxiousness about the consequences and nature of a great power China, some arguing that China will 
rise peacefully and some that it will end in conflict as it will seek to end American hegemony. This 
thesis will argue that China’s rise will be peaceful. It will argue that due to globalisation, cooperation 
and interdependence a violent outcome is improbable as no state would benefit from such a 
scenario. It will argue that although China may seek to increase its leverage in international politics,  
its expansion in relations with the Middle Eastern countries is not a part of a grand scheme to win 
global hegemony, but rather to sustain domestic development. Therefore, it will argue that the main 
objective of China’s expansion in the Middle East, as in other parts of the world, is making money, 
not pursuing hegemony.
Purpose, Aim and Research Question
As China rises as a new major power, the world is watching closely and anxiously, and many different 
opinions on the intentions of the ”Rising Dragon” have been formed. The ”China Threat” and foreign 
policy of contemporary China is a frequently discussed subject in both international politics and 
academia. While plenty of research on Chinese foreign policy in general exists and numerous 
studies have been conducted on China’s presence in other regions of the world, the African continent 
in particular, the pool of previous research on China in the Middle East is shallow. Searching for 
material concerning China and the Middle East on both the Lund University and Copenhagen 
University databases came up with surprisingly few results, and the content of these articles and 
books seemed to point towards a trend that much of the research that has been conducted on Sino-
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Middle Eastern relations in context of the cases presented in this thesis is either outdated or biased. 
This goes especially for material concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, where research dated after 2000 
is hard to come by and in almost all cases is written by supporters of either the State of Israel or the 
State of Palestine and therefore clearly biased. The ”war on terror” is a contemporary issue, which has 
been extensively researched, but little has been said about the Chinese policy towards the conflict and 
the involved parties. Research coming from within China is also very limited, and although it does 
exist the bias is very clear. This thesis will try to fill this gap by attempting to assess the Chinese 
motivations and intentions by examining the Chinese presence and possible areas of special interests 
in the Middle Eastern region in context of addressing both domestic issues and international 
opportunities. Hence, it will attempt to answer the following research question:
• To what extent is China’s foreign policy towards the Middle East influenced by domestic 
issues and to what extent is it guided by a pursuit for increased global political influence? 
by looking at the following sub-questions:
• How have international relations (IR) theories (realism, liberalism, constructivism and post-
structuralism) been used for understanding foreign policy?
• How has Chinese foreign policy developed since the end of the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC)?
• What are the key features of Chinese contemporary foreign policy?
• What factors – internal and external – play the most important part in the formation of 
Chinese foreign policy?
• How has the Chinese policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ”war on terror” 
developed, and how are these factors and features manifesting themselves?
• What would a foreign policy analysis in relation to the questions mentioned above look like 
through the lens of realism, liberalism and constructivism?
Although significant events have occurred in the Middle East recently such as the so called ”Arab 
Spring”, this thesis will not be dealing with these issues in any detail unless it is relevant for an 
argument or analysis. As these events are very young and still rapidly developing it is the author’s 
judgement that conducting a substantial analysis is a near impossible task due to the frequency of new 
developments and the uncertainty of the situation versus the amount of words allowed and time 
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allocated for this thesis. 
Methodology 
Design
This thesis is built upon a multiple case study. The initial nature of the case-study can be said to be 
both exploratory and explanatory, in the sense that it will seek to both explore and explain China’s 
foreign policy towards the Middle East, through two case studies using collected data to explore 
and the theoretical approaches to explain. The advantages of conducting a multiple case study, 
according to Robert Yin, is that it makes the overall study more robust. Although a multiple case 
study is more time consuming, conducting a single-case study is similar to putting ”all your eggs in 
one basket”.1 The two cases selected for this thesis are: the Arab-Israeli conflict (referring mainly to 
the Palestine Question) and the ”war on terror” (referring mainly to the American strikes against Al-
Qaeda following 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003). The 
cases were chosen based mainly on the fact that they are both ongoing events that highly influence 
the situation in the region and the foreign policies of external actors. In addition they can both be 
seen in light of Chinese domestic and foreign policy. As the case studies will show, they both pose a 
challenge to the CCG in terms of balancing internal and external concerns, as well as political and 
economic concerns. China maintains close economic cooperation with both the Arab countries and 
Israel and acknowledges both Israeli and Palestinian statehood. Both sides of the conflict have 
resources that China needs in order to conquer domestic issues, but international pressure due to the 
complexity of the conflict arguably has a certain amount of influence as well. Similarly, the Chinese 
policy towards the ”war on terror” faces the same challenge, as economic and political interests 
conflict with international pressure in the sense that  China seems to be seeking improved relations 
with the U.S. and the Arab countries simultaneously. One of the main criticisms of China coming 
from the Arab world – their treatment of the Chinese minorities belonging to Islam –  conflict with 
their own “war on terror” against the Muslim separatists in Xinjiang and the benefits that increased 
cooperation with the U.S. may bring in this regard.
   For China, who is increasingly and extensively involved in both diplomatic and economic 
relations with both the West and the Middle East, its policies towards the two cases are constant 
balancing acts, where staying on friendly terms with all involved parties is crucial.
   Through looking at these two specific cases, a foreign policy analysis will be conducted and the 
Chinese involvement in the region will be investigated from the perspective of four IR theories. 
1 Yin, 2003, pp. 46-53.
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Realism and liberalism, being the two major classical theories have been picked in order to 
highlight the research from the conventional IR perspective, and as the rise of China has been 
extensively discussed by scholars belonging to these two schools of thought. But in order to 
broaden the theoretical framework and to seek beyond conventional theories, constructivism and 
post-structuralism have been added to the list as well, as these two theories offer alternative 
approaches to what influences state behaviour that go beyond focusing on sovereign nation-states as 
the principal actors in contemporary international relations. As these four theories rest upon 
different epistemological and ontological foundations, the case studies are looked at through four 
different theoretical approaches rather than through the use of a theoretical framework.
Method of Data Collection
The research builds mainly upon qualitative data. However, in order to establish a general picture 
and identify the trends of the Chinese presence in the selected cases, quantitative data has been 
collected as well. Relevant background data was found through international organisations such as 
the United Nations (UN). But as the main focus is Chinese foreign policy, the primary sources were 
Chinese institutions such as the Foreign Ministry of the PRC (FMPRC), the Ministry of Public 
Security of the PRC (MPSPRC) and the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC (MCPRC), and 
although its neutrality and accuracy can be questioned it does provide a clearer picture of what the 
Chinese Central Government (CCG) wants to project. The quantitative data has been converted into 
graphs and diagrams in order to showcase the tendencies which they indicate more clearly. 
  Qualitative data (documents, quotations from interviews and related research) have been collected 
for the purpose of conducting a foreign policy analysis. These include general policy papers and 
information on contemporary issues of special concern published by the CCG and official 
documents and reports on the issues and relevant subjects found through CCG resources, such as 
ministries and embassies. But they also include newspaper articles and news reports from online 
media sites, mainly of Chinese origin such as Xinhua and People’s Daily archives, but occasionally 
also from international media resources of various origin. As most of the qualitative data was in 
Chinese, it had to be translated before being used in the analysis. The original text in Chinese is 
provided in the footnotes. The translated text has been used in order to illustrate the historical 
background of the cases, but primarily to analyse the Chinese stance on them seen through the lens 
of the theoretical approaches described in detail below.
Limitations, Challenges and Ethical Considerations
In the process of looking for data, the researcher encountered several challenges. Access to 
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informants with sufficient knowledge of, and authority on, the issues was very limited due to 
geographical distance, security reasons and willingness to participate in interviews. The lack of 
experts and researchers on the subject of Sino-Middle Eastern relations affiliated with Peking 
University was surprising and did pose a challenge, but at the same time it validates the existence of 
a research gap relating to the topic that the author is trying to fill. Before being introduced to a 
professor whose work was specialised within this particular field of research, the author was met by 
many sceptical remarks from the academic staff at Peking University about the feasibility of the 
research. Furthermore, and as mentioned above, finding unbiased data was not without difficulties. 
In many parts of the West, the Middle Eastern region is associated with security threats and 
undesirable regimes, so much of the existing research on the region, coming from Europe and the 
U.S. in particular, does not express a view that advocates non-interference – which is quite contrary 
to Chinese foreign policy, that strongly builds on noninterference and respect for sovereignty. In 
addition, as the conflicts in the Middle East are so deeply rooted in cultural and religious beliefs and 
differences, these issues are very sensitive and had to be treated with care. Neutrality from the 
researcher’s side is key, and being neither Jewish, Christian, Muslim or of any other religion and 
not being able to identify with or fully support either of the involved parties was an advantage that 
very few researchers of the topic have enjoyed in the past. However, remaining entirely neutral may 
prove to be difficult as the researcher is a young, white, female European who has been taught all 
her life to believe in Western conceptualisations of democracy, tolerance, peace and human rights. 
All of these are concepts that do not necessarily apply or receive priority in the foreign policies of 
the involved countries and the author’s cultural background may challenge the neutrality of the 
research. It thus becomes key to keep in mind to ensure that all collected data is treated equally and 
is observed through an equally critical lens, in order to prevent any biased opinions from 
influencing the research as well as keeping the research itself as neutral as possible. In addition, 
territorial disputes, especially in relation to China, pose a challenge, as treating certain territories as  
either part of China or as independent will be viewed as taking sides. Finally, when conducting this 
research it was essential to stay focused on the initial subject, as the author does acknowledge that 
the subject studied is very large and complex and to study it more deeply would require more time 
and space than allocated for this thesis.
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Theoretical Approaches
International Relations Theory and Contemporary Chinese Foreign 
Policy
Conventional IR Perspectives – Security, Sovereignty and the State
Liberalism and Realism, arguably the two major IR-theories, have very different views on how the 
realm of international relations works. According to Jack Donnelly, realism emphasises that while a 
hierarchical political rule restrains the selfish behaviour within a state due to the presence of an 
authority in the form of a government, the international system lacks such an authority and as a 
consequence states interact in anarchy, and human nature becomes the dominating driving force in 
international relations.2 Guidelines for state conduct in an international context are often grouped 
under the Raison d’État doctrine, prescribing a method of managing foreign affairs in a way that 
safeguards national interests. As the international system is anarchic, the state, serving as the key 
actor in international relations, must keep the pursuit of power central.3 As survival is the most 
fundamental concern of states, they are forced to be capable of some kind of military offense and 
hence, they constitute a permanent threat to each other. As a result of the permanent threat, states  
can never trust each other and the security dilemma will therefore always be a significant factor in 
foreign policy as any state will always be deliberating on beating the other to the punch so as to 
avoid being the victims of an aggression that may or may not be looming. The security dilemma is 
also the reason why international agreements remain weak. The risky environment of the 
competitive anarchic system causes states to choose self-interest and survival over cooperation. 
The state’s sovereignty, after all, is at stake, and protecting it is vital as it is the most basic 
precondition for the legitimacy of statehood. Therefore, as states are rational, they are constantly 
thinking about how to survive, which requires a certain amount of suspicion. Suspicion is caused by 
the unpredictable intentions of other actors, which are a result of power competition and national 
interests. It will in most cases result in a conflict between one or more states and in the worst case 
scenario it may lead to war.4 A unipolar system will always be unstable, as balancing powers will 
eventually rise and seek to challenge the hegemon which may cause the system to change into a bi- 
or multipolar one. That bi- or multi-polar system, and the rise of competitors will provoke the 
former hegemon which may result in a new unipolar system and so on.5 
2 Donnelly, 2009, pp. 31-32.
3 Ibid., p 51.
4 Mearsheimer, 1994/1995, pp. 10-11.
5 Donnelly, 2009, pp. 40-41.
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   Since the economic reforms of Deng, China has experienced a significant, steady economic growth 
as well as an increase in international political activities. This new found strength has caused both an 
increase in China’s self confidence, but also an increase in other states’ concerns about the nature and 
intentions of the new great power and its ability to balance or even overthrow U.S. hegemony. As a 
result, the CCG keeps stressing their Independent Foreign Policy of Peace (独立自主和平的外交政
策) and emphasising their peaceful intentions. 
   In the opening statement of a debate with realist Zbigniew Brzezinski, John Mearsheimer, another 
realist, seems convinced that China’s rise will not be as peaceful as its leaders strive to project. His 
argument is that if the intense development of the Chinese economy continues, Sino-American 
military and security competition will increase causing arms proliferation, which then in turn makes 
violent conflict a highly probable outcome. He further argues that the ultimate goal for any major 
power is to pursue national interest and gain as much power in international relations as possible. 
As a rising China will threaten to decrease American power and as the U.S. will try to defend it, a 
violent conflict of some sort is inevitable.6 Brzezinski, on the other hand claims that China’s 
economic interests are far more important than challenging U.S. hegemony. He brings up the 2008 
Olympics and the Expo 2010 and argues that the efforts put into organising these events reflect a 
pursuit for international acceptance and economic opportunities rather than malign intentions of  
world domination. That being said, he does not write conflict off completely, as acts of balancing 
power, which may very likely lead to friction, can be identified. Military aggression is, however, 
highly unlikely.7
   Liberals believe that human nature is inherently good and informed by rationality in the sense that 
states possess the ability to pursue self-interest but also the ability to act according to law and moral 
values rather than acting according to instinct.8 This interpretation of human nature facilitates the 
argument that international cooperation is not only possible, but highly probable, especially if a 
harmony of interest can be identified, as two actors with similar interests are highly unlikely to 
engage in conflict with each other. In Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) view, republican liberal 
democracies are unlikely to engage in war with each other because they have the same fundamental 
interests and will therefore gain more through cooperating with each other. Liberal and authoritarian 
states, however, do not necessarily share the same values and interests and may therefore provoke 
conflict.9 This view is also reflected in Francis Fukuyama’s (1952-) article The End of History?, in 
which he argues that the end of the Cold War was a clear indication of the inevitable victory of 
6 Mearsheimer, 2004. 
7 Mearsheimer & Brzezinski, 2005. 
8 Kant, 1970, pp. 41-43.
9 Ibid., p 100.
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capitalism over communism and liberal democracy over authoritarian regimes.10 Faced with a 
question on the nature of the rise of China during a speech at the University of Sydney, Fukuyama 
argues, that the contemporary international system is different from the one which dominated 
international relations 30 years ago, and that military conflict caused by the rise of China is highly 
improbable due to globalisation, interdependence and economic development as well as the 
negative impact such a conflict would have on all involved parties.11
  Although sovereignty is the defining characteristic of the nature of the state, states are not seen as 
the only significant actors in contemporary international relations. Multinational corporations,  
international organisations, social movements and transnational groups, that have emerged as 
globalisation has progressed, are now as important actors in contemporary international relations as 
the sovereign state. The result of globalisation and the rise of transnational actors in addition to the 
increasing number of liberal democratic states around the globe has given rise to a theory of 
complex interdependence, formulated by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Complex 
interdependence theory further argues that military aspects are no longer the only main focus of 
foreign policy, as it has been gradually replaced with economic objectives. As a result, the line 
between domestic and foreign policies has become increasingly blurred, but it also leads to a 
decline in the chances of aggression between states in whose relationship complex interdependence 
prevails. However, as not all countries are intertwined in the cobweb of complex interdependence, 
military means may still be used between rivaling blocks of allies.12 
    Although liberals, like realists, perceive the international system as anarchic, international 
agreements still constrain state behaviour significantly. The UN, for instance, serves as a barrier for 
great powers to do as they please in the sense that they tend to go through the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) before they enter into a conflict. However, it does not mean that they will completely 
abandon their plans if the UNSC votes negative on the resolution, as was the case of the American 
led coalition war in Iraq.
    Threats to a state’s security can arise from a variety of places and in various shapes and sizes. 
The concept of sovereignty, however, is often argued to be the key to the security of a state. 
Sovereignty asserts both the state’s ultimate authority within its national borders and its 
membership in the international community, but it is essential to point out that it does not mean 
absolutum dominium or a complete freedom of action, especially within the contemporary 
10 Fukuyama, 1989, p 3.
11 Ibid., 2008. 
12 Keohane & Nye, 1998, pp. 83-85.
12
international arena. 
   Sovereignty is and has always been very influential in the Chinese foreign policy, although the 
need for China to compromise its strong notion of the concept has become more frequent as its 
enmeshment in the international arena has increased. for example, when Iran embarked on a nuclear 
programme, China had to make this compromise. Even though China perceived the actions of the 
international community as a violation of Iran’s sovereign rights it did not veto the proposed 
sanctions in the UNSC. Instead, China opted to push for a relatively non-binding statement, 
claiming that fear of alienation from the strong opposed states would harm China’s national security 
as being viewed as an aggressor or be antagonised is not a desirable scenario for China.13 In relation 
to the Taiwan Question (台湾问题), however, China’s stance on sovereignty remains very strong 
and has influenced many if not all of the Chinese vetoes cast on UNSC resolutions.14 Upholding the 
One China Policy is already a source of disagreement between China and parts of the international 
community and therefore, sticking to the principle of respect for sovereignty is vital in order not to 
lose legitimacy. In addition, having such a strong stance on sovereignty eases relations with partner 
states that are in conflict with each other. It also makes China a desirable trading partner as it, in 
contrast to many Western countries, pursues a so-called ”no questions asked” policy, where it 
seldom comments publicly on the domestic affairs of its partners.15 
Constructivist Perspectives – Norms, Values and National Identity.
For constructivists the international structure and its influence on state behaviour is key. While 
rationalist theories are actor-based and focus on the material (power and wealth), constructivists 
seek to investigate international structures in terms of the social (meaning and social value). States 
are embedded in dense networks of international social relations whose perceptions of a state play a 
large part in shaping a state’s perceptions of the world it is part of. It is necessary to start by 
examining these social relations rather than the actors, as the state and its interest is informed by 
socially constructed values and norms of what can be considered good and appropriate. State 
leaders and their decisions are highly influenced by this normative context, and as that normative 
context is changing over time, as internationally held norms and values shift, state interest is 
inevitably changing as well and external threats or demands can therefore not be identified as the 
only factor in redefinitions of state interest.16 As mentioned earlier, international institutions play a 
large part in this process, as they generally represent internationally held norms and values. The UN 
13 Kemp, 2010, pp. 78-79.
14 UN, 1997.
15 Kemp, 2010, p 65.
16 Finnemore, 1996, pp. 2-3.
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and the IMF, for example, have guidelines or charters formulated, that dictate acceptable conduct 
for their member states. These guidelines or charters reflect the socially constructed general 
consensus of what constitutes appropriate behaviour as they are formulated in a forum of 
representatives from the member states and not by the institution itself. States themselves set these 
norms and values and adhere to them in order to remain part of the society and legitimise their 
actions. This so-called logic of appropriateness coexists with a logic of consequences, which also 
informs state behaviour based on their concerns for costs and benefits.17 Seen in context of the 
Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, these two logics seem to be represented very well. The policy 
stresses not only China’s peaceful intentions, but also its loyalty towards the norms and values of the 
international community – or what can be deemed appropriate. The ”soft power” approach that China 
has taken in its international relations embodied mainly by their policy of non-intervention and 
respect for sovereignty has allowed China to increase their political and economic influence in 
various regions of the world, while at the same time contrasting themselves to the U.S. and their ”hard 
power” approach by opposing hegemonism and power politics and advocating peaceful negotiations 
rather than military intervention as the main strategy in conflict resolution.18 This has caused China to 
become a more desirable partner for cooperation with certain states that find the ”no questions asked 
policy” appealing and within certain fields that benefit the objectives of Chinas national interests – 
leading to beneficial consequences.
   As the institutions are not the direct actor behind formulating these sets of norms and values it can 
be argued that the closest things to a higher authority than the sovereign state, are the norms and 
values that shape actor’s interactions with each other. The international system is therefore still 
regarded as anarchic, but the anarchic system becomes whatever the states chose to make of it. 
Alexander Wendt (1958-) argues that states act towards objects, including other states, based on the 
meanings that they attach to them. Reality is shaped by socially constructed ideas and perceptions,  
such as sovereignty and human rights, rather than things whose existence is independent on human 
agreement, such as human nature or self-interest.19 In addition, the state itself is a constructed entity 
as its features change with its actions, which are informed by its surroundings. The construction of 
the national identity of a state thus depends on the internationally held norms and values that it  
chooses to accept and adhere to.20 In China’s Path to Great Power Status in the Globalization Era, 
Samuel S. Kim argues that the debates on the ”Rise of China” need to take into account the 
importance states attach to global citizenship. ”Great power status”, for instance, implies a certain 
17 Barnett, 2008, p 163.
18 White Paper 2011, part III.
19 Wendt, 1992, p 135.
20 Barnett, 2008, p 169.
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level of responsibility. The fact that China keeps stressing its identity as a responsible great power 
indicates that they attach quite a substantial amount of importance to the nature of their global  
citizenship, which as it is socially constructed by the international consensus, constrains their 
behaviour in international relations.21
   According to Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, the construction of Chinese national identity 
rests on its ability to simultaneously claim membership of the developing world and great power 
status. As this dual status plays a central part in Chinese national identity it is also, in turn, key to 
Chinese foreign policy.22 Before Mao, China was quite extensively engaged in trade relations with 
other parts of the world, and until Mao came to power and embarked on an isolationist road where 
these relations to a large extent were ignored, internationally held norms and values had to be adhered 
to in order to maintain good and beneficial relations with its partners. This is also the case for post-
reform China, as opening up to the world has again made it necessary to keep up appearances. 
Democracy, for example, is a value accepted by most countries in the West, and is increasingly 
being implemented in various parts of the world. Indeed, when looking at official documents issued 
by China, it seems like the CCG is very keen to project an image of being on the road to becoming 
a democratic country.23 
  
Post-Structuralist Approaches – Deconstructing Concepts and Discourses.
Post-structuralism adds a dimension to the theories discussed above in the sense that it seeks to 
problematise the interpretations of the concepts central to the approaches. Nothing is inherent in 
events or objects that can determine the correct way of representing them, and therefore the way 
these events or objects are subject to human consciousness and individual interpretative choices, 
which shape our perceptions and depictions of the world.24 While post-structuralism adopts themes 
from conventional IR-theories, it rests on a divergent ontological and epistemological foundation in 
the sense that it revises these themes through genealogy and deconstruction, replacing the term 
”truth” with ”competing perspectives”.25 The dominant position of sovereignty in our 
comprehension of international relations, for instance, has become a barrier to our political 
imagination. In order to fully comprehend international politics it is necessary to look beyond the 
mainstream paradigms of sovereignty and take into account the transversal nature of international 
politics and the deterritorialisation that has come in the wake of the dramatic increase in political,  
21 Kim, 2003, pp. 53-54.
22 Dittmer & Kim, 1993, p 283.
23 White Paper, 2011, part II. 
24 Devetak, 2009, pp. 190-191.
25 Ibid., pp. 186-187.
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economic and cultural activities caused by globalisation.26 In other words, challenging the sovereign 
state as the main determining factor in understanding the character and location of politics is  
central. But stable concepts, such as democracy and security, also need to be deconstructed. The 
impact of democracy cannot be understood unless taking into account a country’s culture, history and 
society, and if one assumes that democracy has universal potential, it is bound to fail.27 
   According to Peter Hays Gries et. al. the same goes for nationalism. In Patriotism, Nationalism 
and China’s US Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National Identity it is argued that 
due to historical and cultural differences, American and Chinese nationalism cannot be put in the 
same category. American assumptions about the nature and consequence of expressions of Chinese 
national identity are therefore rarely valid. As an example, the American display of Stars and 
Stripes following 9/11 is brought up as a gesture which may be interpreted as an expression of 
loyalty towards the U.S. Meanwhile, the flag could also be interpreted as American support for the 
invasion of Afghanistan or a nationalist desire to dominate. The question is, how 
”should Americans understand the flag-waving displays of Chinese […] during the Olympic torch relay
of spring 2008? Was it a benign expression of patriotic loyalty to China, or a malign expression of a desire to 
dominate over China’s foreign critics, from
CNN to free Tibet activists?”28
If one neglects the meanings, values and practices or the historical and cultural context, events or 
concepts can easily be misinterpreted. Going back to the definition of democracy, if one looks at the 
2011 Chinese White Paper and the democratic aspirations reflected in it, it is interesting to note that  
the Western definition of what democracy is, is not followed blindly. While China makes great 
efforts to adhere to them, it also challenges the assumption that the dominating Western thinking and 
views of the world are universally applicable and superior.29 In terms of economic practices, for 
example, Western models have been the mainstream, but since China opened up their economic 
growth has been impressive, it challenges the conventional model. In addition, the Chinese ideology, 
on which their policies rest, is described by the CCG as Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (中国
特色社会主义),30 which from a post-structuralist perspective can be argued to be a demonstration of 
the importance of taking notice of meanings, values and practices that define the national identity of a 
state, which the traditional Western Enlightenment thinking tends to neglect. 
26 Campbell, 1996, p 20.
27 Friedman, 2002, pp. 59-60.
28 Gries et. al., 2011, p 16.
29 McEwan, 2002, pp. 127-128.
30 People’s Daily Online, 8/10-2008. 
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   In terms of the transversal nature of international relations, looking at whom China has a history 
of identifying themselves with is interesting. Postcolonial identity has played a large part in the 
Chinese Foreign Policies of the last century, and during Mao, hostility towards the West as a result 
of years of colonisation was frequently displayed in the Chinese foreign policy.31 The Chinese 
support for the decolonisation movement in the global south played a large part in the transfer of the 
Permanent Seat in UNSC from the Republic of China (ROC) to the PRC in 1971 which would 
arguably never have come through without the support of these countries. Hence, China has since 
been very keen on identifying itself with the group of former colonies, and often appears to prefer 
to be put in the category of developing countries.32 But the difference between Maoist China and 
contemporary China is great, and some would argue that China today belongs to the category of 
developed countries. This, then, leads to the question of what the true status of contemporary China 
is, as it changes as one shifts the lens through which it is viewed. As Gries points out, 
”Chinese are neither innately paciﬁst nor hardwired for conﬂict. Instead, history and culture shape how individual 
Chinese will construe the events of world politics. The social psychology of intergroup relations can then help 
explain whether they will choose cooperation or conﬂict in a given situation.”33
Therefore, from a post-structuralist perspective, the outcome of the rise of China and contemporary 
Sino-American relations is unpredictable as it depends on individual agency.
Foreign Policy Analysis
What is meant by foreign policy?
As globalisation and interdependence are progressing, the line between the domestic and 
international spheres becomes more and more blurred. A policy initially directed towards an 
international issue is in many cases highly influenced by domestic affairs and domestic policies are 
increasingly put under pressure by international demands. Answering questions about why states do 
as they do in their dealings in the international arena based solely on external or internal factors is 
therefore insufficient as an approach. However, it is reasonable to classify a policy as foreign if its 
main target is to be found outside the realm of the state itself – for instance concerning the signing 
of an international agreement, which may have secondary consequences for the people of the state 
in question. Conversely, if a policy’s main aim is addressing internal issues it is to be categorised as 
domestic – as it would be the case with for example an environmental law that primarily affects the 
everyday lives of the citizens of the state, even though it may also have international consequences 
31 Mao 1967, p 155.
32 He, 2007, p 18.
33 Gries, 2005, p 257.
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in terms of, for instance, foreign trade agreements.34 Applying this to Chinese policies would then 
mean that the internet regulation policies are domestic as they are essentially targeting the domestic  
sphere in terms of its limitations on internet access within Chinese territories, but as it influences 
foreign companies and individuals access to the Chinese population it is, in a way, foreign as well. 
Conversely, the much criticised Chinese policy towards the COP15 Summit in Copenhagen in 2009 
would be considered mainly foreign, but it was directed towards the domestic realm as well in the 
sense that the failure to agree to sign the final agreement was due to the negative consequences that 
agreement would have on sustaining Chinese domestic development.
   As touched upon earlier, another concern regarding the line between foreign and domestic is 
territorial disputes.35 for example, The One China Policy (一个中国政策)36 is heavily contested, 
and although a separate visa is required for foreigners wishing to visit Tibet, its independence is 
denied by the CCG. Hence, in relation to issues concerning these areas, questions may arise over 
whether they are part of China or not and therefore whether they can be considered domestic or 
international. The Taiwan Question, however, has been such an important factor in almost all of 
China’s dealings with the international society since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, that it is  
relatively safe to treat it as a foreign issue, regardless of whether Taiwan is to be considered part of 
China or not. 
Who makes foreign policy?
When speaking of foreign policy it is also necessary to determine who the actors behind the actions 
are. Essentially, the state is responsible for its actions abroad. The actors behind the decisions that 
affect the state’s foreign behaviour are the government that resides within the state, government 
institutions and officials. Even though multinational companies or other actors may perform foreign 
actions, they do not count as foreign policies. They may occasionally play a large part in the 
decision making of the state, but as an influential factor rather than an actual actor.37 But as foreign 
policies are often the result of a multilayered decision making process, non-governmental actors, 
such as multinational companies, organisations or institutes should not be automatically excluded 
from any considerations concerning who actually makes foreign policy, although identifying them 
is not necessarily an easy task. Furthermore, governmental actors involved in the process of 
formulating a foreign policy does not necessarily have to be at the national level, they can be found 
on more local levels as well.38 In the case of China, policy making is indeed a very complex process 
34 Beasley et. al., 2002, pp. 3-4.
35 Ibid., p 4.
36 CCG, undated.
37 Beasley et. al., 2002, p 5.
38 Kubálková, 2001, pp. 16-17.
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and the actors involved are many and various. Finally, foreign policy outputs are often the result of 
tough negotiations between multiple stakeholders, from the boards of state-owned companies to 
government or Party officials. However, identifying all of the involved actors in these negotiations 
is an impossible task for any outsider, as the amount of accessible information is very limited due to 
secrecy. In addition, although the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the PRC are in theory two 
separate institutions, all major positions on all governmental levels in China are held by officials  
who simultaneously holds a similar position in the Communist Party of China. Due to the above 
reasons, the term ”China” or ”the Chinese state”, when used in this thesis will (unless stated 
otherwise) refer to the CPC/PRC conglomerate or the appointed officials acting on its behalf. 
Whenever other actors can be identified, they will be mentioned separately. 
What main factors influence the making of foreign policy?
Although the different factors that influence the foreign policies of a state are many and diverse 
they can generally be divided into two categories – internal and external. Internal factors can refer  
to the domestic political system and the citizens and organisations within it. The belief of the CCG 
plays a large role, and as China is a one-party state with leaders who since the establishment of the 
PRC have become more and more reform oriented, debates about proper policy making are 
increasing within the pro-modernisation and the conservative wings of the Party and efforts to 
balance economic prosperity with ideological concerns are rising as a result in order to keep the 
party relevant.39 Meanwhile, public opinion or the views of society as well as groups within society 
of, for instance, one particular religion, are also internal factors that may constrain or trigger certain 
foreign policies. Even in authoritarian states such as China, these have been influential factors in 
high level policy making as keeping the people content enough to refrain from public protests is a 
key element in, for example, the measures taken by the CCG to end corruption on both national and 
local levels. Furthermore, economic interests of certain groups within society have been known to 
play a large part as well, as their interests may be damaged or promoted in the wake of certain 
political decisions. External factors incorporate the characteristics of the organisation of the 
contemporary international system and interactions within it – directly or indirectly including the  
state which forms the object of analysis. There is no consensus about the precise structure and 
nature of the international system and as became clear in the previous section, different IR-theories 
have very different interpretations of the way the system and the actors within it work. As examples 
of external factors influencing Chinese foreign policy can be named the international decision to 
impose sanctions on China following the Tian’anmen Event in 1989 or the more recent reluctance 
of the international society to add the Chinese Yuan to the IMF currency basket. The former caused 
39 Ripley, 2002, pp. 128-32.
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a setback in China’s Open Door Policy as a reaction to the international community’s interference 
in Chinese domestic affairs and the latter has played an important role in the Chinese willingness to 
lend money to crisis struck states in, for instance, Europe.
Central Concepts
Power and Hegemony
The concept of hegemony can be defined as the condition ”where one state or group of states 
determines the external conduct of all others”.40 As the theoretical approaches have different 
ontological foundations, their interpretations of the concept differs as well. 
   While realists tend to operate with hegemony in terms of military and economics as a result of a 
struggle for power or great power politics, liberals perceive the basis of hegemony as stemming 
from an enlightened self-interest. To liberals, hegemony is a result of deliberate choice excercised 
through, for instance, international trade rather than coercion. In order to consolidate its hegemony, 
and due to interdependence, a state needs to work towards the common interest of all actors 
(stability), rather than work directly towards an increase in power. From a realist perspective, 
pursuing hegemony can thus be said to be motivated by relative gains, while liberals believe it to be 
motivated by absolute gains.41
   Constructivists view the pursuit for power in terms of ”the complex relationship between norms, 
legitimacy and hegemonic power”.42 The preconditions, causes, meanings, implications, and correct 
responses to the balance of power is something that states consider, rather than take for granted. 
The same goes for the concept of sovereignty, which is a result of internationally held norms and 
values rather than something that exists ontologically. Pursuing hegemony, from a constructivist 
perspective is highly influenced by the meaning they attach to the concept, which in turn is 
influenced by the international conception of it.43 Post-structuralists, taking great interest in the 
projected normalisation of subjectivity, takes deconstructing the meaning of the concept of 
hegemony as a startingpoint. According to Richard Ashley, hegemony is ”an ensemble of 
normalized knowledgeable practices, identified with a particular state and domestic society […] 
that is regarded as a practical paradigm of sovereign political subjectivity and conduct”.44 
Hegemony is projected as a general model of conduct, but from a post-structural point of view, it is 
by no means natural. Not unlike constructivists, post-structuralists question the ontology of 
40 Linklater, 2009, p 148.
41 Burchill, 2009, pp. 66-68.
42 Reus-Smit, 2009, p 233.
43 Barnett, 2008, pp. 162-163.
44 Ashley, 1989, p 269.
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hegemony, seeking to explore its historical, cultural and political conditions in order to lift the veil  
that has been concealing its arbitrariness.
Making Money
As mentioned earlier, this thesis will argue that the motivations of the contemporary Chinese 
foreign policy is to be found in a desire to ”make money”, rather than pursue hegemony. When it 
comes to its relations with the Middle East, as this study shows, China seems to be focused mainly 
on imports rather than exports, and questions may therefore arise about whether China is in fact 
making money or spending money in the region. However, it is necessary to point out that what is 
meant by ”making money” is directly linked to the importance that China attaches to sustaining 
socioeconomic development. China's own energy-reserves and technological knowledge is not 
unlimited, and as it is crucial to obtain and sustain the flow of commodities such as oil and energy-
related technology in order to sustain economic growth, in the end, they serve the greater purpose of 
making money. Therefore, although at first glance it seems like China is spending their money 
rather than making it, it is arguably the other way around. Exports are a bonus, but not the main 
focal point.
Chinese Foreign Policy – External vs. Internal Pressure
The conflict between new found strength and increased external pressure is clearly playing a large 
part in contemporary Chinese foreign policy. As Xia Liping notes, 
”There are two outstanding characteristics in China’s current foreign policy: peace and independence. ‘Peace’ 
indicates that China formulates its foreign policy from the viewpoint of whether it is beneficial to international and 
regional peace and stability, instead of the viewpoint of getting military superiority. ‘Independence’ indicates that 
China formulates its foreign policy according to its national interests and the common interests of peoples of all the 
countries in the world.”45 
The 6 fundamental principles on which the policy rests all underscore this position, covering subjects 
such as anti-hegemonism, a fair and rational world order, respect for sovereignty, increased 
interaction and mutual cooperation.46 Indeed, ”independence” and ”peace” do seem to dominate 
contemporary Chinese rhetoric both within the internal and external political realm. While the  
former has dominated Chinese politics throughout the existence of the PRC from the self-
sufficiency policies of the early Mao era to the more moderate proclamations of making 
45 Xia, 2001, p. 18.
46 ”China’s Independent Foreign Policy of Peace”. Xinhua Archive, 19/1-2003. 
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independent political decisions without yielding to external pressure, the latter is a concept that was 
never a priority before the reforms of Deng. On the contrary, Chinese foreign policy during Mao 
Zedong was of a rather hostile character,  stating that ”regarding [progressive and just wars] we, the 
communists, do not oppose them, we actively take part in them”.47 This is a standpoint that is 
clearly a contrast to that of the contemporary Chinese leadership, whose approach is that ”no matter 
how the international situation changes […] China’s foreign policy is to maintain world peace and 
promote common development.”48 
   Another prominent aspect of Chinese foreign policy within the frameworks of all administrations 
from Mao/Zhou to Hu/Wen is the principle of nonintervention. Although the rhetoric has changed 
somewhat, the concern for great power bullies and their interference in other states domestic affairs 
remains key. In 1964, Mao stated that ”all countries subjected to American aggression, control, 
intervention and bullying should unite and form a broad united front opposing the aggressive and 
warmongering American imperialist policies.”49 
   In the 2011 White Paper, the core idea remains the same, but the words are different. ”[China] 
does not interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries. It opposes the big bullying the small 
and the strong oppressing the weak”.50 This standpoint is frequently referred to by Chinese officials 
when external forces express concern over the rise of China. One example is FMPRC spokesman 
Qin Gang response to the American Vice President Dick Cheney’s comments on Chinas lack of 
transparency and his argument that the rise of China poses an international security threat in 2007. 
Qin listed 8 principles of the Chinese diplomatic philosophy all echoing the views of the 
Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, comparing the American government’s penchant for sticking 
their nose in other countries internal business to a nosy neighbour or a stranger in the street 
demanding others to take off their underwear in public.51  
 A domestic factor with great influence on the Chinese foreign policy is sustainable development 
and the Harmonious Socialist Society (社会主义和谐社会).  In his report at the 17th Party Congress 
Hu Jintao pointed to the building of a harmonious socialist society as a central element to the 
47   我们共产党人 […] 不反对进步的正义的战争 […] 而且积极地参加. Mao 1967, p 54.
48 不管国际风云如何变幻，我们始终不渝地奉行独立自主的和平外交政策。中国外交政策的宗旨, 是维护世界
和平, 促进共同发展. Jiang, 2002. 
49 所有受到美国侵略, 控制, 干涉和欺负的国家要联合起来, 结成最广泛的统一战线, 反对美帝国主义的侵略政
策和战争政策. Mao, 1967, pp. 153-154.
50 [中国] 不干涉别国内部事务, 反对以大欺小, 以强凌弱. White Paper 2011, Part III.
51 Washington Times, 1/3-2007.
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Scientific Outlook on Development (科学发展观) which has been his signature policy since 
assuming office in 2002. According to Hu, 
   ”Scientific development and social harmony are integral to each other […] Building a harmonious socialist society 
is a historical mission of socialism with Chinese characteristics, as well as a historical process and the social 
outcome of dealing with various social problems in a correct way based on development. It is through development 
that we shall increase the material wealth of society, improve people’s lives constantly, and guarantee social equality 
and justice and constantly promote social harmony.”52
According to Alterman and Garver, the main external goal of the Chinese Middle East policies is
”expanding friendly, multidimensional cooperation and relations of mutual understanding and trust 
with all countries in the region, which entails maintaining a degree of neutrality and 
evenhandedness in conflicts within Middle Eastern states”.53 Of course, befriending certain Middle 
Eastern states whose relations with the U.S. are not particularly friendly, such as Iran or Iraq, does 
to a large extent fuel the suspicions of China’s benevolence. However, contemporarily befriending 
states that do enjoy friendly relations with the U.S., such as Israel or Saudi Arabia, backs up the 
argument that the Chinese policy of neutrality and multidimensional cooperation is, in fact, legit. 54 
The main internal goal is ”channelling Middle Eastern resources – export markets, capital and, 
above all, petroleum – into China’s development drive. To secure access to petroleum resources in 
the event of crises, Beijing seeks to encapsulate energy supply relations in political relations 
valuable to the supplier.”55 As the Chinese economy is growing, the need for natural resources 
follows, and even though China is the fifth largest oil producer and holds around 13% of the global 
coal reserves,56 imports have increased dramatically in recent years (See Figure 1), the CCG seems 
to have become aware of the threat this poses to the domestic socioeconomic development that on 
the one hand is main catalyst for many of the challenges to Chinese policy making and on the other 
hand is so important to sustain. 
Figure 1: Total Oil Imports 2001-2007 (million tonnes).
52 科学发展和社会和谐是内在统一的[...]建社会主义和谐社会是贯穿中国特色社会主义事业全过程的长期历史
任务，是在发展的基础上正确处理各种社会矛盾的历史过程和社会结果。要通过发展增加社会物质财富, 不
断改善人民生活又要通过发展保障社会公平正义, 不断促进社会和谐. Hu, 2007, p 3. 
53 Alterman & Garver, 2008, p 19.
54 Ibid., p 20.
55 Ibid., p 19.
56 Hallding et. al., 2011, pp. 68-70.
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Source: The MCPRC 
http://acs.mofcom.gov.cn/sites/aqzn/cyjzlnr.jsp?contentId=2440435684951. (19/3-2012)
In solving the developmental impasse that China is experiencing, the Middle East, being very rich 
in natural resources as well as technology, is a key partner. China needs turn to foreign trade to meet 
its growing demand for oil in order to prevent stagnation of development, and in 2006 the Middle 
East accounted for 44% of oil flows into China.57 
   In short, sustaining domestic development is key, not only in order to maintain China’s leverage 
in international politics but also in order to maintain national stability. At the same time,  
maintaining an image as a responsible rising power also seems central, as the anxieties among other 
states caused by China’s rise is an external security issue.
Case Study 1: The Arab-Israeli Conflict
Historical Context 
Although China and Israel did not formally establish diplomatic relations until the 1990’s, Israel 
was among the first Middle Eastern countries to recognise China in 1950. Having just come out of 
the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the newly established state of Israel was in dire need of recognition from 
the international society, and as neither the communist ideology of China or U.S. concerns were 
playing a significant role, recognising China rather than Taiwan was at that time seen as the more 
favourable option as it might pave the way for recognition amongst the Third World Countries of 
which China at the time was a self-proclaimed patron.58 Premier and Foreign Affairs Minister Zhou 
Enlai subsequently expressed his gratitude for Israel’s choice of allegiance and bilateral interactions 
started to take form. However, due to the outbreak of the Korean War, Israel chose to break off 
57 Kemp, 2010, pp. 68-69.
58 Abadi, 2004, pp. 69-70.
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negotiations following U.S. pressure until the mid-1950s when Israel expressed a wish to establish 
diplomatic relations with China, but at that point it was too late, as the Suez Crisis and the Bandung 
Conference had brought China closer to the Arab states and a Chinese policy towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict favouring that side was already in the making.59 
   From the early 1960s, hostility towards the West and their allies played an increasingly large part 
in Chinese foreign policy making. The revolutionary focus of the CCG during the Cultural 
Revolution and their moral and financial support for national liberation movements and 
revolutionary organisations around the globe, among them the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) intensified China’s pro-Arab/anti-Israeli policy.60 In addition, the Six Day War and the Israeli 
victory brought further tension to Sino-Israeli relations, as this particular event was seen as a 
provocation from the imperialist U.S. and its puppet Israel who had committed a serious crime 
against the Arab people.61 The deteriorating Sino-Israeli relationship caused the Sino-Arab 
relationship to bloom, and the blooming Sino-Arab relationship caused the Sino-Israeli relationship 
to deteriorate further and finally come to an end in the mid 1960s. 
   When the heat of the Cultural Revolution began to fade, the need for domestic reforms in order to 
rehabilitate and rebuild a very fragile China became more and more pressing. The opportunity to let  
Western investments in was too great to pass by and as a result the Chinese foreign policy was 
reevaluated. The improved Sino-American relations sparked new attempts to establish Sino-Israeli 
relations and as a result the support for the PLO was cut dramatically, with the argument that in 
order to solve the conflict, military means had to be replaced with peace talks and friendly 
negotiations.62 The image of Israel as a U.S. puppet was gradually replaced with that of an 
independent player after American attempts to pressure the Israeli government to stop settlements in 
Palestinian territories had failed, and as the PLO made no real progress, it became clear to the CCG 
that much more was to be gained from engaging in cooperation with Israel than Palestine.63 
Following the Camp David Accords,  Sino-Israeli cooperation blossomed further, but support for 
Palestinian independence remained, and in late 1988 China formally recognised the State of 
Palestine (see Table 1).
Table 1 Establishment of Sino-Arab Diplomatic Relations 
Country Date of establishment
59 Wang, 2009, p 478.
60 Sobin, 1991, pp. 114-115.
61 Jabber, 1970, p 62.
62 Abadi, 2004, pp. 75-76.
63 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
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Egypt 30 May 1956
Syria 1 August 1956
Yemen 24 September 1956
Iraq 25 August 1958
Kuwait 22 March 1971
Lebanon 9 November 1971
Jordan 7 April 1977
Oman 25 May 1978
UAE 1 November 1984
Qatar 9 September 1988
Palestine 20 November 1988
Bahrain 18 April 1989
Saudi Arabia 21 July 1990
Source: The FMPRC.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/. (19/3-2012)
Entering the 1990s, Arab-Israeli peace talks were progressing and as a result hostilities between the 
parties were reduced, and with the Soviet Union out of the picture and improving Sino-American 
relations, taking part in the Arab-Israeli peace process was seen as an opportunity for China to 
expand its network and thereby its options for sustaining economic growth.64  In addition, the 
sanctions imposed on China by the West in the wake of the Tian’anmen Event in 1989 caused a cut-
off in the supply of Western technology, which was crucial for continuing economic development. 
Israel being a friend in need by supplying the desired technology, may have facilitated the increase 
in Sino-Israeli dealings which eventually led to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations on 
January 24th 1992.65 By then, China had already established formal relations with the majority of 
Middle Eastern countries belonging to the Arab League (see Table 1), so Chinese support for the 
restoration of the territorial rights of Palestine continued after the establishment of Sino-Israeli  
relations, but at the same time emphasising the independence and legal rights of the state of Israel  
was key in order to balance relations with the two adversaries in the conflict.  After the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, efforts to develop Sino-Arab relations were 
intensified, China took a more active role in promoting Arab-Israeli peace talks, and Chinese 
diplomats attended more conferences on Arab-Israeli issues than in prior years. During the 1990s, 
various peace initiatives, such as the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the Oslo Accords in 1993 
were met with great support by the CCG, with frequent calls for both the Israelis and the Palestinian 
militant organisations to renounce violence.66 
64 Sobin, 1991, p 123.
65 Kumaraswamy, 2005, pp. 93-94.
66 Wang, 2009, pp. 481-483.
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   This position continued into the 2000s. Between April 12th -18th 2000, President Jiang Zemin 
became the first Chinese head of state to visit Israel and Palestine to discuss the peace process. 
During the visit, he pointed out that in solving the conflict, military means, opposition and mutual  
rejection had to be replaced by peace talks, cooperation and mutual understanding based on relevant 
UN resolutions and with the UN as the main mediator.67 During a conference in Saudi Arabia in 
2006, President Hu spoke on the subject of ”establishing Middle Eastern peace and constructing a 
harmonious world society” explaining China’s willingness to contribute to the Middle Eastern 
peace process and expressing a wish to promote Sino-Arab friendship.68 When the time came for the 
Sino-Arab Cooperation Forum in Beijing in 2006 Mahmoud al-Zahar, the Palestinian foreign 
minister and a Hamas representative, was cordially invited.69 This event was met with a certain 
level of opposition from U.S. and Israeli sides, but in order to showcase the sincerity of their 
promises to Palestine, the critical voices were to a large extent ignored by China. However, 
considering the fact that Hamas was viewed by Israel and the U.S. as a terrorist organisation, the 
FMPRC later justified their position by stating at a press conference that ”the Palestinian 
government is legally elected by the the Palestinian people and their choice should be respected.” 70 
In November 2008, President Hu and Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas 
marked the occasion of the 20th  anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Palestinian diplomatic 
relations by exchanging their gratitude and promises of mutual support.71 As political relations 
evolved, Chinese economic relations with the Arab countries increased (see Figure 2), and the Arab 
countries, known for being rich in natural resources, remain to this day one of the main sources for 
Chinese oil imports.72
   Despite the Chinese support for Palestine and its flirts with Hamas and criticisms of Israel’s 
handling of the question of Palestine, Sino-Israeli dealings, especially within the economic realm, 
continued to evolve in a positive direction (see Figure 2). Since China established diplomatic 
relations with Israel in the early 1990s, it has become the main exporter of Western technology to 
China. Up until now it has been mainly a source of advanced military technology that China would 
not be able to get otherwise due to arms embargoes.73   
67 Ibid., p 483.
68 促进中东和平, 建设和谐世界. ”Hu Jintao Delivered an Important Speech at the Saudi Consultative Meeting”. 
People’s Daily Archive, 24/4-2006.
69 ”Li Zhaoxing: Strengthening the Forum will Benefit the Afghan People”. Xinhua Archive, 31/5-2006. 
70 巴勒斯坦政府是巴勒斯坦人民民主选举产生的政府, 应该得到国际社会尊重.  FMPRC, 2006. 
71 ”Chinese and Palestinian Leaders Congratulate Each Other on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations”. Xinhua 
Archive, 19/11-2008. 
72 Alterman & Garver, 2008, p 6.
73 Kemp, 2010, p 139.
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Figure 2: Trade Surplus 2001-2007 (Million USD).74
Source: The MCPRC.
http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/aa/aa.html (20/3-2012).
What appears to be the main barriers to increased Sino-Israeli cooperation are not China’s dealings 
with Israel’s regional enemies. U.S. pressure on Israel has been known to hamper several large-
scale dealings with China, such as the Phalcon sale in 2000. In addition, and arguably as a result of 
U.S. pressure, Israel has been known to engage in arms deals with Taiwan, which is sensitive for 
China.75 
   In terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in addition to the focus on peaceful conflict resolution in 
contemporary Chinese foreign policy, simultaneously increasing relations with the two sides have 
resulted in a policy of peaceful negotiations as the proper way. In a speech in 2000, President Jiang 
outlined a four point policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Firstly, the historical development of the 
conflict must be taken into account. Secondly, peace talks, cooperation and tolerance must replace 
armed conflict, opposition and antagonism. Thirdly, any action must comply with the relevant UN 
resolutions. Fourthly, the peace process should be based on respect for each country’s security, 
territory and independence. Only then can sustainable peace be achieved.76  Six years later, his 
successor President Hu emphasised these points in a speech, but this time with more focus on the 
implications of the conflict for the rest of the world, stating the importance of the Middle Eastern 
region in world politics. Hu argued that ”without stability and development world peace and 
prosperity is impossible. Peace in the Middle East serves not only the long-term interests of the 
74 Notes: Complete trade statistics are only available from the MCPRC until 2007. Later statistics are available but 
incomplete. However, they do indicate that the 2001-2007 trend continues relatively unchanged until 2011.
Saudi Arabia has been used as a sample in this figure as it is the most prominent actor in Sino-Arab trade relations 
and is therefore likely to be most influential in Chinese Middle Eastern policies.
75 Kumaraswamy, 2005, pp. 99-100.
76 ”President Jiang Visits President Mubarak”. People’s Daily Archive, 18/4-2000.
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countries and peoples in the region, but also those of the international society.”77 China currently 
accounts for 4 of the 151 experts on mission in the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO),78 
and continuously votes in favour of most resolutions in the UNSC regarding the peace process in 
the Middle East.79 When the Israeli military forces intercepted the Ship to Gaza operation carrying 
humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip, the international community strongly condemned the actions.  
China followed suit, labeling the actions taken by Israel ”military attacks on the international rescue 
fleet”.80
   As China continues to expand its presence in Middle East, it is highly likely that its Arab partners 
will call for a more active role in advocating the rights of the Palestinian people. However, China’s 
soft-power diplomacy and expanding economic links in the region suggest that it is likely to stick to 
the neutral position in the Arab-Israeli conflict as economic benefit has caused the development of 
Sino-Israeli ties to become increasingly important in China’s policy towards the conflict.
A Balancing Act 
As Chinese relations with the involved countries are increasing rapidly, there can be no question 
about the fact that China is making a move in the Middle East, at least in terms of economics (see 
Figure 2). Seen from a realist perspective, this can be interpreted as a pursuit for outbalancing the 
U.S. presence and become a more powerful player in the region. However, China’s policy towards 
the conflict and increasing relations with the involved parties can be traced to both internal and 
external factors. Both oil imports from the Arab countries and technology imports from Israel are 
crucial for China in the future, and without them China would be facing major problems in 
sustaining domestic socioeconomic development, which would pose a rather substantial security 
threat. Had China supported only or mainly the Arab countries in the conflict, it would antagonise 
the U.S. and its Western allies, harming its relations with its number one trading partners. 
Supporting only Israel in the conflict, would have antagonised its Arab League allies and 
subsequently harmed the oil imports which remain so crucial for domestic sustainability.  On the 
other hand, being neutral and thus projecting an image as a responsible great power to the rest of 
the world through strongly advocating peaceful negotiations in finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, is arguably a result of international concerns about the capabilities of a rising China, that  
put pressure on the CCG. The arms embargo and the back door that Israel has become for supplying 
77 没有中东的稳定和发展, 就没有世界的和平与繁荣。一个和谐的中东符合本地区各国和各国人民的长远利益, 
也是世界的共同期盼. ”Hu Jintao Delivered an Important Speech at the Saudi Consultative Meeting”. People’s 
Daily Archive, 24/4-2006. 
78 UN, 2012.
79 UN, 2007, part 1.
80 以军袭击国际加沙救援船队. ”Military Attacks on the International Rescue Fleet in Gaza”. People’s Daily Archive, 
01/06-2010.
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China with advanced technology is obviously viewed as a security concern in the U.S., and the fact 
that no statistics on these dealings are available from either the MCPRC or the Central Bureau of 
Statistics of Israel can easily be attributed to the controversy of these dealings, especially in relation 
to U.S. worries about the potential scenario of China using these technologies against them or their 
allies in Asia (mainly Taiwan). In turn, U.S. concerns about China’s intended use of this technology 
arguably poses a security threat for China, who cannot be sure of the extent to which the U.S. will 
act on its anxieties. 
   A liberal would argue, that international cooperation and complex interdependence is in fact the 
main reason for China’s neutral position. It is not in line with Chinese national interest to 
antagonise any of the involved parties (Israel, the Arab League or the U.S.) as it would harm the 
economy too much. Neither would it be in the interest of China’s partners to antagonise China, as it 
may cost them a major trading partner and their economies would suffer as well. China may have a 
communist authoritarian regime which increases the chances of conflict, but since they adopted a 
liberal market economy, they have become too intertwined in the cobweb of international economic 
relations, that conflict is not a favourable position to be in for any of the parties. Had Israel and the 
Arab League been equally involved in trade relations, there would arguably be no conflict. 
However, due to the long history of the conflict, such relations have never been established, and 
therefore they do not share the same fundamental interest and have little incentive for cooperating.  
The fact that China tends to vote in favour of relevant resolutions in the UNSC supports the 
argument that China believes in international cooperation and the role of the UN. 
    In terms of China’s strong stance of sovereignty, it is interesting, that no vetoes on the matter 
have been cast from the Chinese side since 1972.81 Normally, when it comes to international 
intervention, China tends to veto or at least abstain from voting in order to keep its arguments 
against international meddling in the Taiwan Question legit. International intervention is arguably a 
violation of Israel’s sovereign rights, but as China also recognises Palestine, Israeli occupation is 
arguably also a violation of Palestine’s sovereign rights, which cannot go unnoticed. Abstaining 
from voting on the resolutions would then seem to be the obvious path to take. However, even 
though China has been known to abstain on several occasions, it could be interpreted as an act of 
indifference to the solution of the problem, and as China strongly advocates peace and cooperation, 
voting in favour sends a better message to the international society and helps supporting China’s 
image as a responsible great power. 
81 Global Policy Forum, undated.
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   Through the lens of constructivism, the balancing act of China’s Palestine policy should also be 
seen in relation to international norms and values as well as China’s national identity. During Mao, 
when China staunchly supported Palestine and opposed Israel, its national identity was that of a 
revolutionary patron of post-colonial independence movements. As China opened up it gradually 
started adopting the norms and values of the international society and incorporated them into its 
policies. Due to their shared postcolonial identity with the Muslim countries, China has always 
supported the rights of the Palestinians and is still doing so in order to maintain its close diplomatic 
relations with the Arab countries, who are rich in oil and natural resources, which is essential for 
sustaining the Chinese economy. On the other hand, the goal of achieving sustainable development 
is becoming more and more important to the CCG, so China’s standpoint on the conflict is not as 
tendentious as it used to be as the benefits for development that comes with having relations with 
Israel are many.82 As the Chinese economy today is closer to the Western liberal market economy 
than to the Soviet model used in the Mao era, supporting the claims of Israel alongside those of the 
Arab countries has become a necessity. The contemporary Chinese national identity has been 
infused with internationally held norms and values that originate in the West, which has led to an 
ability to identify with states that it would never have been able to identify with earlier. 
   During the 1990s, as China’s engagement in international relations accelerated, some seemed 
inclined to think that underneath the pragmatic policies of multilateralism, the CCG was still to  
some extent biased towards supporting the Arab side of the conflict in an attempt to counterbalance 
American power in the region, due to the lingering focus on developing country identity in Chinese 
foreign policy. In reality, however, China’s policy towards the conflict since Deng has been very 
much in line with the international consensus, stressing the role of the UN as a mediator and the 
internationally held norms and values of using peaceful negotiations and cooperation rather than 
violence and antagonism in solving the conflict. This view is quite explicitly expressed in almost 
every single official statement or document relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict issued by the CCG. 
   The Chinese voting history in the UNSC and its implications for the image as a responsible great 
power is also relevant in terms of the internationally held norms and values, which the UN arguably 
represents. According to the UN Roadmap to a solution of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the only 
way to successfully achieve a two-state solution is 
”through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against 
terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel’s 
82 Alterman & Garver, 2008, p 3.
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readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a clear unambiguous 
acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement.”83 
The Chinese position on the conflict clearly reflects this view. The fact that China puts such a 
significant effort into conforming to internationally held norms and values in the case of the Arab-
Israeli conflict points to a desire to be perceived as acting in accordance with what the international  
consensus deems appropriate. Such conduct limits the negative factors that possible trading 
partners in the region take into account when considering dealing with China, and thus increases the 
positive consequences for domestic socioeconomic development. China’s tendency of voting in 
favour of relevant resolutions reflects its ”soft-power” approach and contrasts it to the U.S., who 
frequently uses its veto power to block resolutions regarding Palestine. 
   Balancing dealings with two to sides of a conflict without being enmeshed in political dilemmas 
is something that China has been very good at in the past,84 and if they are able to do so in this 
particular conflict and maintain their shared postcolonial identity bonds with the Arab countries as  
well as reassuring the West of their good intentions by developing their ties with Israel and their 
Western allies, the chances of being able to enjoy both the oil of Arab countries and Western 
technology for renewable energy can be greatly increased.
  Using the post-structuralist approach, a key element in balancing China’s Palestine policy is taking 
into account the differences in the  discourse of the conflicting parties. ”Intifada” in Arabic means 
”resistance”, but seen from the Israeli point of view it is an act of terrorism. What Israel has called 
the ”separation wall”, the Arab side calls a ”segregation wall”. Similarly, clashing views of Israel’s 
invasion of Gaza in 2008 as an act of self-defense or aggression also exist. The Chinese response to 
this particular event shows China’s efforts to balance these conflicting discourses. The Chinese 
representative, Liu Zhenmin, expressed during an emergency meeting in the UNSC that 
”The international community must take immediate action to prevent a further deterioration of the situation. As a 
first step to ease the humanitarian crisis, we call upon Israel to put an immediate end to all of its military operations 
in Gaza, to lift its blockade and to open all crossing points so as to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian supplies to 
Gaza.”85 
Meanwhile, he also emphasised that 
83 UN, 2003, p 1. 
84 Alterman & Garver, p 20.
85 国际社会必须立即采取行动, 阻止局势恶化。作为缓解人道危机的第一步, 我们敦促以色列立即停止在加沙
的军事行动和封锁, 全面开放过境点, 以便利对加沙的各类人道物资的供应. UN, 2009. 
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”[China understands] Israel’s security concerns and are opposed to any attacks that target innocent Israeli civilians. 
However […] ’answering violence with violence’ and ’imposing collective punishment’ will not provide security for 
anyone or contribute to the resolution of issues; they can only aggravate the confrontation and spark mistrust 
between the two parties, which in turn will cause further suffering to both peoples. Continued armed conflict 
between the two parties will worsen the prospects of Israel and Palestine as two independent States living in 
peace.”86 
On the one hand, support for the Palestinian people is expressed and Israeli actions are condemned, 
securing the trust of the Arab countries in China’s good will towards their cause. The support of 
China, a P5 member of the UNSC, is of some importance, as Israel has already secured the support 
of the Americans. On the other hand, Israel’s situation is acknowledged and the terrorist activities 
on the Palestinian side are condemned, expressing support for their cause as well. 
   It is clear that a lot is at stake for China in managing its relations with the two opposite sides of 
the Arab Israeli conflict. Economic benefits from trading with both sides, as well as maintaining an 
image of being a responsible great power by not taking sides is clearly a priority in the Chinese 
policy towards the Question of Palestine. Whether Palestine really matters to China, however is 
questionable. Chinese trade with Palestine (see Figure 2) is not very impressive, and China does not 
seem to have any interest in Palestine as such. However, by supporting Palestine, it gains trust from 
the Arab League and benefits from their natural resources as well as their need for importing 
Chinese manufactured products. By supporting Israel’s case it gains access to highly desired 
advanced technologies. It truly is a balancing act of a policy towards an extremely infected conflict,  
and so far, China has managed not to fall off the edge.
Case Study 2: The War on Terror
Historical Context
Historically, acts of terrorism within China’s borders have been relatively scarce. However, the 
reforms of Deng in the late 1970s, and opening up to the outside world increased the amount of 
foreign influence on Chinese society and subsequently also acts of terrorism within Chinese 
borders, which have been inspired by similar incidents or aided by similar groups abroad. Initially 
these acts were referred to as criminal activities rather that terrorist attacks, and it was only in the 
86 我们理解以色列对维护自身安全的关切, 反对任何袭击以色列平民的行为。但”以暴易暴”集体惩罚”不能
给任何一方带来安全, 不能促进问题的解决, 只会加剧双方的对立与隔阂, 给双方人民带来更多灾难。如果双
方的武装冲突持续下去, 以色列和巴勒斯坦两个独立国家和平共处的前景, 也只会越来越远. UN, 2008.
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wake of the East Turkestan Movement (ETM) in Xinjiang in the early 1990s that the Chinese 
authorities began using the term ”terrorism” to describe this kind of violent actions.87 Until 1989 the 
movement’s activities within Chinese borders were few, but the chaos in the Middle East following 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the emergence of Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
caused new links between radical organisations in the Middle East and Xinjiang.88 The 
independence of former Soviet states and the Tian’anmen Incident sparked Uyghur ambitions to 
become independent and the ETM increased their activities in the region with the help of its Middle 
Eastern links.89 Between 1990 and 2001, the Uyghur’s have been responsible for 20090 attacks 
mainly in the Xinjiang region but occasionally also major cities in the East, such as Beijing. Most 
of these attacks were related to separatist movements targeting the Han majority as a result of 
government development policies, which have caused an increase in ethnic Han Chinese people 
living in Xinjiang and a subsequent widening social gap, as the living standards of the two ethnic 
groups differ quite substantially.91 The PRC’s concerns during the 1990’s regarding Xinjiang were 
composed by a number of events relating to the unravelling of the Soviet Union and the newly 
found independence of the Central Asian states as well as events involving Islamic fundamentalist 
elements, especially the fall of Kabul to Taliban in 1996 which they feared would spread within 
their borders.92 As a result, Chinese authorities began formulating an anti-terrorism strategy 
focusing on the ETM uprisings in Xinjiang  and in June 2001, after establishing the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), China signed a cooperation agreement to strike against terrorism, 
separatism and extremism – what has become known in Chinese politics as ”The Three Evils” (三
害 ).93 
  In the wake of 9/11, Chinese engagement in international counter-terrorism efforts has increased. 
China had earlier been focusing mainly on regional cooperation, but following the Al-Qaeda attacks 
in New York and Washington DC the paradigm changed as Beijing saw an opportunity to put its 
battle with separatists in the west in an international context and make it a part of a common 
international struggle against terrorism.94 President Jiang was very quick to immediately condemn 
the attacks and join the chorus of world leaders expressing their willingness to support the 
American led global counterterrorism efforts by expressing sympathy to President Bush, the U.S. 
government and the American people as well as declaring their condemnation of all forms of 
87 Pan, 2004, pp. 523-524.
88 Sun, 2010, pp. 196-197.
89 Ong, 2006, pp. 101-102. 
90 Note: As the definitions of ”terrorism” are many, this number may be disputed.
91 Chung, 2002, pp. 8-12.
92 McNeal, 2001, p 2.
93 ”Xie Hangsheng: We Must Safeguard the Legal Interests of the Overseas Chinese”. Xinhua Archive, 11/3-2012. 
94 Chung, 2002, p 10.
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terrorism.95  And in October both President Jiang and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan arrived in 
Washington DC to attend a high-level meeting on counterterrorism, followed by a delegation of 
Chinese counterterrorism experts with the purpose of aiding U.S. experts in their efforts. During the 
visit, Foreign Minister Tang set out criteria for U.S. military response by stating that China would 
support counterterrorism measures and actions based on objective and substantial evidence, which 
complies with the UN Charter and has the support of the UNSC. Although no concrete 
preconditions for Chinese support were present among the criteria, Chinese officials had earlier 
expressed a hope for American support in their own battle with terrorists.96
   During the months after the attacks, President Jiang exchanged numerous telephone conversations 
not only with President Bush, but also with the other P5 countries in the UNSC, discussing 
international opposition to terrorism as well as the war in Afghanistan and the Taliban problem.97 
On January 20th 2003, Foreign Minister Tang spoke at meeting in the UNSC on the terrorism issue, 
reaffirming the Chinese view on terrorism. He pointed out that 
”safeguarding peace and security for all of humanity is the core of anti-terrorism. Universal development and 
common prosperity is the basis of anti-terrorism. Strengthening intercultural communication safeguards anti-
terrorism and promoting and deepening international cooperation is the key to antiterrorism. Terrorism is a global 
challenge, and China, being a responsible country, cherishes peace and the maintenance of peace. We firmly support  
and will actively participate in the international fight against terrorism.”98
Another paradigm that shifted somewhat in the wake of 9/11 was the Chinese voting behaviour on 
UNSC resolutions relating to the ”war on terror”. As China is notorious for opposing, abstaining 
from voting and even vetoing resolutions that can be accused of interfering with sovereignty, it is 
interesting to note that in 2001 positive votes were cast on both resolution 1368 expressing 
”[the Council’s] readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to 
combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations”99 
95 中国政府一贯谴责和反对一切恐怖主义的暴力活动. ”President Jiang Phones President Bush”. People’s Daily 
Archive, 12/9-2001.
96 Glaser, 2001, p 30.
97   Wang, 2009, p 494.
98 维护人类和平与安全是反恐的核心[...] 普遍发展与共同繁荣是反恐的基础[...] 加强文明之间的沟通与融合是
反恐的保障[...] 推动和深化国际合作是反恐的关键. ”Tang Jiaxuan Speaks at a Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 
Counterterrorism issues in the Security Council”. People’s Daily Archive,  21/1-2003. 
99 UN, 2001a.
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and resolution 1373, deciding that ”all States shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist 
acts”100 despite the fact that they do actually interfere with state sovereignty by telling them what 
they have to do. 
   As China increased its efforts in international cooperation on battling terrorism, advocating 
cooperation and dialogue with the Arab states increased as well. Following 9/11, Chinese officials 
held meetings with a variety of leaders from the Arab League, including conversations between the 
Secretary General to the Arab League Amr Moussa and Foreign Minister Tang in October 2001 and 
meetings between President Hu and King Abdullah II of Jordan in January 2002, expressing a wish 
to strengthen Sino-Arab counter-terrorism cooperation and stressing the importance of including the 
Arab countries in international efforts.101 China had been facing criticisms from the Arab League 
regarding the treatment of the 30 million Muslims living in China, so staying on friendly terms with 
the countries in the Middle East by acknowledging and supporting their importance as a player in 
international cooperation was arguably quite an important move. 
   Shorty after 9/11, coalition forces invaded Afghanistan on a mission called Operation Enduring 
Freedom. The Taliban regime was removed from power and the Democratic Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan was founded and an interim government was created. The International Security 
Assistance Force was established by the UNSC in order to secure Kabul. The force is currently 
controlled by NATO. Most of the Taliban leaders, including Osama Bin Laden, fled to Pakistan.102 
   Fortunately for China, the UNSC never voted on legitimising the American invasion Afghanistan 
following the events of 9/11. China would not have been able to vote in favour of such a clear 
violation of Afghanistan’s sovereignty, nor would they have been able to veto, as it would have 
been perceived by some forces in the international community as an act of obstruction which would 
have led to a questioning of its sincerity in claiming to be a responsible and peaceful nation. 
Abstaining would have sent out an image of an indecisive China, which would not have been a 
100 UN, 2001b.
101 Wang, 2009, p 495.
102 New York Times, 19/12-2001. 
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favourable outcome either. 
   However, Foreign Minister Tang expressed during a 6+2 Group meeting at the UN headquarters in 
New York that ”we cannot interfere in the sovereignty, internal affairs and territorial integrity of 
Afghanistan, the Afghans should be the real drivers, rather than sitting in the driver’s seat while 
others manipulate the throttle and brake.”103 Similarly, the Chinese reaction to the U.S. coalition 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 following American allegations against the Saddam Hussein regime and its 
supposed links to terrorist organisations, reflect a concern for Iraqi sovereignty. China had voted in 
favour of resolution 1441 which granted UN weapons inspectors the permission to investigate Iraq 
following their failure to cooperate on earlier occasions.104 However, the American invasion was 
seen as an act of violating the international consensus and hampering the peace process in the 
Middle East. On March 21th 2003, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference National Committee issued a statement stressing that 
”Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity should be respected and maintained [and calling] for the countries 
concerned to comply with the appeal of the international community, stop military actions and continue to seek a 
political solution to the Iraq issue within the UN framework.”105
In early May 2011, Osama Bin Laden, the head of Al-Qaeda was killed in Pakistan by U.S. troops, 
marking ”the most significant achievement to date in [U.S.] effort to defeat Al-Qaeda. Yet his death 
does not mark the end.”106 The killing of Osama Bin Laden was generally received with relief by 
the international community as well as a large amount of countries worldwide, including China.107 
The Chinese response to Osama bin Laden’s death did not come as promptly as the response to 
9/11.  The FMPRC issued a statement on May 2nd, which expressed that the killing of Osama Bin 
Laden  was ”a milestone and a positive development for the international anti-terrorism efforts [and 
that] the international community should step up counterterrorism efforts”.108 
   The delay of the statement may be attributed to the fact that on the one hand the killing of Osama 
Bin Laden was a very welcomed event in relation to China’s battle with the ETM, but on the other 
hand American forces had intervened on Pakistani territories and thereby arguably violated their 
103 不能干涉阿富汗的主权, 内政和领土完整, 阿富汗人应成为名副其实的司机, 而不是他们坐在驾驶座上, 由别
人操纵油门和刹车. ”Why spend lots of money to aid Afghanistan? - Interview with Arab Affairs Ambassador”.  
Xinhua Archive, 29/1-2002.
104 UN, 2002.
105 Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, 2003.
106 The White House, 2/5-2011.
107 Reuters, 2/5-2011. 
108 这是国际反恐斗争的重要事件和积极进展 […] 国际社会应进一步加强合作, 共同打击恐怖主义. ”Foreign 
Ministry Spokesman Answers Questions from the Press Following the Killing of ”Al-Qaeda” Leader Osama Bin 
Laden in Pakistan”. People’s Daily Archive, 03/05-2011. 
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sovereignty. Pakistani authorities had not authorised the operation beforehand and as a result the 
rhetoric of U.S.-Pakistani relations following the event was rather harsh.109 China being a staunch 
ally of Pakistan due to a mix of its tepid relations with India and its support for Pakistan in its 
rivalry with India, was naturally concerned about this possible violation of Pakistan’s territorial 
integrity.110
   Despite the significance of Osama Bin Laden’s death for the ”war on terror”, the international 
consensus does not seem to be that the war has ended. The U.S., the CCG, the UN and NATO have 
emphasised that terrorism is not a closed chapter. Al-Qaeda still exists, albeit their leader has been 
eliminated, and like the U.S., who are still facing a threat embodied by Al-Qaeda, the Chinese 
authorities are still battling the ETM in Xinjiang. It is therefore highly likely that China will  
continue its position towards and engagement in international counterterrorism efforts.
A Balancing Act
As was the case in the policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, the policy towards the ”war on 
terror” also poses a challenge in terms of balancing Chinese foreign policy. China’s national interest 
in solving the conflict was outlined by ambassador Wang during the Tokyo conference in 2002, and 
is a clear example of the interests at stake. First, assisting and supporting developing countries is an 
essential part of China’s foreign policy. Second, China, being a P5 member of the UNSC and one of 
Afghanistan’s neighbours, is sincere in its efforts in achieving lasting peace and development in 
Afghanistan as it will also help crack down on Taliban in the region. Third, during the Taliban 
regime, Al-Qaeda supported the Uyghur separatists and posed a threat to domestic peace and 
stability in the Xinjiang region, therefore China is also a victim of terrorism. Finally, aiding 
Afghanistan’s development is helpful to future Sino-Afghan economic cooperation and may help 
boosting the development of Chinese enterprises in the Afghan market.111 
  In terms of realist perceptions of the security aspect of national interest, peace in the region and 
the development of Afghanistan is important. The years of instability in the region and eliminating 
Taliban in Afghanistan, one of the main goals of the American ”war on terror”, benefited China in 
the sense that it, to a large extent, cut off one of the ETM’s main sources of weapons and moral 
support. On the other hand, it stirred up trouble in close vicinity to Chinese borders which was not 
something that China would be very interested in, considering that it might spill over and cause 
even more unrest in the unstable western Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang.112 In addition, 
109 The Guardian, 4/5-2011. 
110 ”Bin Laden’s Family Expelled by Pakistan”. Xinhua Archive, 18/4-2012. 
111  People’s Daily Online, 29/1-2002.
112 Roy, 2002, pp. 515-517.
38
focusing on the role of the UN could be seen as an attempt from the Chinese side to keep the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) away from its borders. China holds a P5 seat and enjoys a 
substantial amount of power in UN decision making, but has no real say in NATO, so UN presence 
in unstable border regions would be a more preferable option than having NATO interfere in the 
region. 
In terms of liberal perceptions of the economic aspects of national interest, peace and development 
in the region would help expand the Chinese Middle Eastern market which in turn would benefit its 
domestic socioeconomic development. Trade with Afghanistan has begun to blossom since 2001 
and, similarly, trade with Iraq has been rehabilitated since the dramatic decrease since the American 
invasion in 2003 (see Figure 3). Eliminating terrorism would therefore benefit China economically 
in terms of an increase in trade. In addition, cooperation with the U.S. and other international actors 
in battling terrorism is beneficial for all parties. Eliminating terrorism would eliminate a global  
security threat, and hence there is an incentive for multilateral cooperation. 
Figure 3: Trade Surplus 2001-2007 (Million USD).
Source: The MCPRC.
http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/aa/aa.html (20/3-2012).
In relation to national identity, seen through the lens of constructivism there is a need for balancing 
China’s relations with the developing countries and the West. China identifies with the developing 
countries in the Middle East and supports their cause and their continued development, but also 
wants to send an image to the West as being a responsible great power. It is made clear that China 
seeks to help the involved countries in the Middle East, but at the same time they also identify with 
the West in terms of being victims of religious extremist terrorist groups, embodied by or supported 
by Taliban and Al-Qaeda. In addition, internationally held norms and values have also played a 
large part in the Chinese ”war on terror” policy. The fact that the consensus of UN and the 
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international community was ignored by the U.S. when they invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and that the war in Iraq was later deemed illegal, was arguably seen as an act of superpower 
chauvinism as well as a violation of the territorial integrity of the involved Middle Eastern 
countries. The UN and therefore the international community and the norms and values that they 
represent were not adhered to and, according to China, counted as breaking the rules. China, having 
always been very particular about stressing their own commitment to these rules, saw this as an 
opportunity to emphasise their own position. But in addition, the most powerful nation in the West, 
who had been part of making the rules in the first place, had also been the one to break them. This 
helped in legitimising China’s image as a responsible great power with friendly intentions, an image 
that the U.S. had been a frontrunner in questioning the sincerity of. In a statement released by the 
FMPRC shortly after the invasion of Iraq it was stressed that 
”the Chinese government advocates, as always, a policy that complies with the framework of the UN in solving 
the war in Iraq, demanding that the Iraqi government act in compliance with the relevant UN resolutions; 
meanwhile, Iraqi sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected by the international society.”113 
Adhering to international norms and values are, as always, the key to solving any conflict. But the 
statement also reflects the balancing act between Middle Eastern and Western allies, calling upon 
all parties to respect the international consensus as well as Iraq’s sovereignty. 
   In order to deal with the Chinese policy towards the ”war on terror” in the context of post-
structuralism it is necessary to first look at different definitions of the term. According to a draft bill  
issued by the MPSPRC, terrorism is defined as ”acts intended to induce public fear or to force state 
organs or international organisations through violent means, sabotage, threats or the like […] In 
addition, funding or assisting these activities also counts as acts of terrorism.”114 According to the 
Central Bureau of Investigation (CIA), ”’terrorism’” means premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”.115 
The UN does not have a legal definition of the term, and although a draft bill has been made, 
member states were not able to agree.116 While definitions vary according to different governments 
with different objectives, the closest thing to an international consensus about what constitutes 
113 中国政府一直主张在联合国框架内政治解决伊拉克问题,要求伊拉克政府全面,切实地执行安理会有关决议;
同时认为伊拉克的主权和领土完整应该得到国际社会的尊重. MFPRC, 2003.
114 采取暴力, 破坏, 恐吓或者其他手段制造社会恐慌, 胁迫国家机关或者国际组织的人 [...] 煽动, 资助或者以其
他方式协助实施上述活动的, 也属于恐怖活动. ”Chinese Legislation in Defining Terrorism Caught Foreign 
Media’s Attention”. Xinhua Archive, 26/10-2011. 
115 CIA, undated.
116 UN, 2005.
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”terrorism”, is arguably that, as it usually harms innocent civilians, it is an act of evil. In a statement 
released after 9/11, Osama Bin Laden stated that 
”God Almighty hit the United States at its most vulnerable spot […] What the United States tastes today is a very 
small thing compared to what we have tasted for tens of years. Our nation has been tasting this humiliation and 
contempt for more than 80 years. Its sons are being killed, its blood is being shed, its holy places are being 
attacked, and it is not being ruled according to what God has decreed.”117
 
Clearly, if viewed through the eyes of Al-Qaeda, 9/11 was not an act of evil, but a righteous act of 
God’s will against the real terrorists – the Americans. One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter.
   China is a victim of Al-Qaeda sponsored terrorism in Xinjiang. But they are also battling 
separatists in Tibet and, in their view, Taiwanese separatists, and therefore the Chinese definition 
seeks to legitimise not only 9/11 but also other acts that are not necessarily defined as terrorist acts 
by other states. The Chinese definition clearly condemns international terrorism, as it was seen in 
the case of 9/11. But as the American definition does not clearly condemn all of the groups that 
China would like to label ”terrorists”, Western discourse is challenged and not necessarily seen as 
the most accurate.
   A more obvious example is found in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003, 
which from Chinese side (apart from being seen as an American attempt to establish oil hegemony 
and strategic domination) was seen as a clear example of how the West perceived their form of 
democratic government to be superior with total disregard for cultural, historical, or traditional  
differences.118 The basis of the American invasions was, apart from hunting terrorists, to establish 
democratic governments. Although China in its White Paper puts a clear emphasis on its democratic 
ambitions, the democracy that they seek to establish is not necessarily equal to that of European 
countries or the U.S., mainly because it does not take into account the history and cultural 
background of China. The same would go for Iraq and Afghanistan. Establishing a Western style 
democratic system in either country would ignore their heritage and would be bound to fail. 
Acknowledging the culture and history of the Middle Eastern countries while supporting the 
Western battle against a common evil is central to the Chinese policy towards both the ”war on 
terror” and the Middle Eastern peace process as a whole.
117 BBC News, 7/10-2001.
118 Alterman & Garver, 2008, pp. 14-15.
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Cross Case Reflections
Although China’s presence in the Middle East is increasing, and although it is highly likely that 
China, like most states, bases its foreign policy on realist assumptions of security dilemmas, it 
seems unlikely that it should end in a violent conflict with the U.S. China seems very preoccupied 
with projecting an image as a responsible great power with peaceful intentions, and while this is 
most likely due in part to the fact that the CCG does not wish to trigger foreign aggression against 
China, such reactions seem as improbable as China turning malign overnight. The liberal argument, 
that the world has changed since the Cold War and that complex interdependence has made 
cooperation a more favourable option than war seems quite valid in context of the Chinese Middle 
East policy. China is no longer the isolationist communist state that it used to be under Mao, and as 
Deng’s reforms have caused a shift in both domestic and foreign Chinese politics towards a more 
economic focus, China is now able to identify with the West to an unprecedented extent. The fact 
that China is a staunch supporter of the UN as the main mediator in international conflicts supports 
not only liberal arguments concerning international cooperation, but also constructivist arguments 
stressing the importance of socially constructed international norms and values. As this thesis has 
shown, China frequently emphasises its own adherence to the rules of the international society and 
its commitment to its role as a global citizen. The two case studies reflect a certain level of concern  
both for what is deemed appropriate (opposing terrorism and violence, respecting sovereignty and 
protecting innocent civilians) and what the consequences of its international actions are (increased 
access to natural resources, more leverage in international politics and enjoying friendly relations 
with as many other actors as possible). As the two cases demonstrate, the nature of the Chinese 
foreign policy appears to be rather opportunistic. The post-structuralist approach to meanings and 
values as forms of Rorschack tests where beauty is in the eye of the beholder, can easily be applied 
to the Chinese Middle East policies. Conflicting discourses are frequently seen in both the Arab-
Israeli conflict and the ”war on terror”, something that China seems to be quite aware of, often 
taking into account that the meaning of a concept may vary according to different actors with 
different historical and cultural backgrounds. All in all it is quite possible to view Chinese foreign 
policy through the lens of all the above theories, though it would seem that liberalism, 
constructivism and post-structuralism holds merit over the likelyhood of a realist outcome.
Conclusion
The Chinese policies towards both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ”war on terror” are, as have 
been demonstrated earlier, balancing acts, in which material gain is given a central role. Domestic  
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development must be sustained, and as China modernises, the need for natural resources as well as 
advanced technology increases. The ”no questions asked” approach that China has adopted in its 
relations with trade partners reflects its pursuit for economic growth. Domestic development and 
economic growth go hand in hand, and as the former cannot be sustained without the latter and vice 
versa, the Chinese approach seems to be to support whoever is a more valuable partner in terms of 
economic gains. Israel and the U.S. (representing the West) have become vital trade partners for 
China, and although post-colonial bonds with the Arab countries prevail, ideology seems to play 
little if any part in the Chinese Middle East policy, and one may be inclined to question whether 
China’s concern for its relations with the Arabs would be as strong had they not been as rich in 
natural resources as they are. 
   Taking into account the issues discussed in this thesis, internal and external factors seem to play 
fairly equal parts in the Chinese Middle East policy. Internal pressure embodied by the challenge of 
sustaining socioeconomic growth is a major driving force behind Chinese foreign policy, but at the 
same time external pressure, in the form of the international society’s perceptions of China, has 
increased as China has become a more powerful actor in international relations, and must be taken 
seriously in order to sustain China’s international trade. The two case studies presented both suggest 
that what unites internal and external factors is economic interest. While China has a lot to gain in 
the Middle East in terms of international image and trade, evidence that indicates that overthrowing 
U.S. hegemony is given priority by the CCG is extremely scarce. Pursuing hegemony in a 
globalised world in which China is becoming more and more enmeshed would gamble everything 
that Deng’s reforms have achieved. It would jeopardise both the Chinese domestic socioeconomic 
development and security environment. Had the Cold War not ended and the world not been as 
globalised as it is today, pursuing hegemony and balancing the U.S. would arguably have been quite 
probable. But in contemporary international relations it is simply too risky and the negative 
consequences that would come in the wake of hampered economic relations would be too great for 
all involved parties. China’s socioeconomic development rests on too fragile a foundation to engage 
in power politics and military confrontation.
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